



Th e act of decision making is a crucial factor when 
it comes to managing crisis. Th rough the insights 
of the interdisciplinary area of theory of decision-
making it is possible to acquire a better understan-
ding about the process of decision-making itself, 
the ways in which people should decide, and the 
ways in which people usually decide. Maintaining 
acceptable stress levels of crisis managers is of key 
importance, especially in unpredictable and ever-
changing conditions of a crisis, when environment 
requirements are the greatest. Decision theory 
enables us to understand basic principles of hu-
man behavior in making choices and judgments. 
Although a stand-alone academic subject, it is of 
great interest for economists, statisticians, psycho-
logists, politicians, sociologists and philosophers. 
In the subsequent text, in addition to a brief des-
cription of each theory, these theories are going 
to be observed through the interest perspective 
of crisis management, with an emphasis prima-
rily on theoretical rather than technical overview. 
A major part of rich content created by yearlong 
research of issues concerning decision-making is 
concentrated on deciding under risk and ambigu-
ity. Inspection of people’s mistakes in such choi-
ces can be particularly important in the context of 
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crisis decision-making as characterized by severe 
lack of time and information. Th is paper examines 
practical values of particular decision models, po-
ssibilities of an organization’s structural adaptation 
in order to improve effi  ciency of crisis decision-
making, and the ways in which lessons learned 
can be integrated for improving quality of perfor-
mance and reduction of negative stress eff ects in 
crisis management.
2. SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES TO 
DECISION-MAKING
Th roughout the history, researchers have created 
various perspectives on decision-making, met-
hods of examining decision-making and theoretic 
models in attempts to explain it (Edwards, Miles, 
& Winterfeldt, 2007). Th erefore, we can diff eren-
tiate between three basic perspectives in the the-
ory of decision-making (Hansson, 1994):
1. Normative, with an emphasis on rational 
choice, has generated models built on as-
sumption that should provide logical guide-
lines for decision-making.
2. Descriptive, which describes the ways in 
which real people deal with making choices.
3. Prescriptive, intended to help people in 
decision-making by using normative models, 
with respect to limits of human judgment and 
practical issues concerning implementation of 
rational models in a real world, accompanied 
by simplifying a complex decision environ-
ment to a reasonable level susceptible to 
analysis (Surowik, 2002). 
3. NORMATIVE MODELS OF 
DECISION-MAKING
A decision presupposes the choice between diff e-
rent alternatives or options. Th ey are usually cour-
ses of action available to a decision-maker in the 
time of decision-making, or at least what the deci-
sion-maker believes to be so. A set of alternatives 
can be well- or ill-defi ned. In some problems of 
decision-making it is open, while in other it is clo-
sed (e.g. deciding about how to spend an evening 
versus deciding which party to vote for). In deci-
sions where the set is open, the goal is to close the 
set by choosing one of the alternatives. In actual 
life, open alternative sets are especially common. 
In decision theory they are not, and it is regularly 
assumed for sets of alternatives to be closed. Th e 
reason for this is that closure makes decision pro-
blems much more accessible to theoretical tre-
atment. If the alternative set is open, a defi nitive 
solution to a decision problem is not available.
In the theory of decision making two features of 
a process play an important role; outcomes and 
the states of nature. Th e possible outcomes of a 
decision are defi ned as the combined eff ect of a 
chosen alternative and the state of nature that it 
obtains. Out of diff erent states they have been gi-
ven following denominations (Hansson, 1994):
1. Certainty if each action is known to lead 
invariably to a specifi c outcome. 
2. Risk if each action leads to one of a set of 
possible specifi c outcomes, each outcome oc-
curring with a known probability, with prob-
abilities assumed to be known to the decision 
maker.
3. Uncertainty if either action has as its conse-
quence a set of possible specifi c outcomes, 
but the probabilities of these outcomes are 
completely unknown.
Each of the mentioned states calls for a diff erent 
type of knowledge; deterministic knowledge for 
certainty, complete probabilistic knowledge for 
risk and partial probabilistic knowledge for uncer-
tainty (Hansson, 1994). 
3.1. Expected utility and subjective 
expected utility
Th e dominant approach to deciding under risk 
(known probabilities) is expected utility theory 
(EUT). It is, undoubtedly, the main paradigm in 
normative and descriptive interpretations of the-
ory of decision-making. 
Utility is the numerically represented value of an 
outcome of a decision. Th e basic rule is simple: the 
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alternative with the highest ascribed value should 
be chosen. In cases where there are more than two 
alternatives with maximum value the supplemen-
ted rule is to pick either of the alternatives with 
the highest value. Th is is the rule of maximizati-
on. Most of the economic theory is based on the 
idea of utilitarianism – that one should maximize 
their assets, expressed in monetary values. Cri-
tiques of utilitarianism argue that it is too much 
of a requirement for actual decision makers (Han-
sson, 1994). Th e very idea of utility is dubious in 
psychological sense, therefore, economists favor 
the term ‘’preference’’. One may not have the abi-
lity to assign numerical values to utilities, but can 
express preference of some specifi c courses of acti-
on (Surowik, 2007).
In some of its early versions, EUT did not refer to 
utilities in a contemporary sense but to monetary 
outcomes. It was recommended to play a game if it 
increases expected assets, otherwise it is not. Pro-
babilities related to this were objective frequencies, 
as the ones observed in rolling a dice. However, 
attributed utility of assets is not described by a 
linear trend as gambling continues, instead, it 
grows by a falling rate. Th erefore, fi rst $1000 won 
is perceived as less valuable than $1000 won when 
a person is already a millionaire. Th is leads to the 
theory of subjected expected utility (SEUT). 
From the mathematical point of view, the sum of 
probabilities of an event A and its opposite should 
be 1. Still, that is not the case in the concept of SEUT. 
An important argument against SEUT as the des-
criptive model of choice concerns diff erences betwe-
en known and unknown probabilities. Th is distinc-
tion comes under various labels: risk in opposition 
to uncertainty; clearly defi ned versus ambiguous 
probabilities; precise versus indeterminate probabi-
lities etc. Empirical evidence shows that the amount 
of knowledge about probability of actualization of 
an outcome can indeed aff ect the choice of a course 
of action (Camerer & Weber, 1991). 
In the application of the decision theory to eco-
nomic problems, subjective utilities are commonly 
used. In risk analysis, on the other hand, objective 
utility is the dominating approach. Th e common 
way to measure risk is to multiply the probability 
of a risk with its severity, to call that the expectati-
on value and to use this expectation value to com-
pare risks (Hansson, 1994).
3.2. Th e Paradox of Uncertainty
In making choices between options of the same 
probabilities people show a tendency toward aver-
sion of uncertainty. People prefer acts with a known 
probability of winning. Th at is, they take confi den-
ce in estimates of subjective probability into acco-
unt when making choices. Ellsberg concludes that 
the degree of uncertainty, or, in contrast, reliability 
of estimation of probability, has to be considered in 
decision analysis. Th is notion is accepted not just 
from theoreticians but from analysts of decision 
making as well (Camerer & Weber, 1991). 
In the context of risk analysis, it is the task of the 
risk assessor to use any available information to 
obtain a number between 0 and 1 for a risk-esti-
mate, with as much precision as possible, together 
with an estimation of imprecision (Hansson, 1994).
3.3. Bayesianism
In expected utility, probabilities are taken for 
frequencies or potential frequencies of events in 
big, potentially endless numbers of repetitions in 
a physical world (Surowik, 2007). Alternatively, 
probabilities can be taken as a mere mental phe-
nomenon. Subjective probability is defi ned as a 
degree of belief which is diff erent for diff erent 
persons. Th e theory of subjective expected util-
ity with properties of subjectively defi ning prob-
abilities and utilities is called bayesian theory of 
decision-making or bayesianism (Hansson, 1994). 
Th e range of its use is broad, from clinical trials 
to the implications in the development of artifi cial 
intelligence. 
Bayes’ theorem is a method used to calculate the 
validity of beliefs (hypothesis, claims and propos-
als) based on the best available evidence (observa-
tions, data and information). Th e theorem states as 
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follows: Th e probability that some belief is correct 
according to new evidence = the probability that 
the belief is correct regardless of evidences × the 
probability that evidence is correct along with an as-
sumption that the belief is correct ÷ the probability 
that the evidence is correct no matter the accuracy 
of belief. Or, to simplify: initial belief + new evidence 
= new and enhanced belief (Horgan, 2017). 
Importance of Bayesianism is refl ected in the fact 
that it is a very general philosophy of theoretical 
and practical problems of statistical reasoning. 
When the practical function of Bayesian methods 
of decision making is experimentally examined, 
the results are contradictory. Savage, the founder 
of Bayesian theory, points out that it is not so be-
cause something is wrong with Bayesian theory, 
rather it is the proof that for the majority of people, 
an improvement in decision-making competency 
is required (Albert, 2003). 
4. DECISION-MAKING UNDER RISK: 
PROSPECT THEORY
Prospect theory is relevant for the issue of deci-
sion-making in general. Developed by the re-
nowned psychologists, Daniel Kahneman and 
Amos Tversky, it explains the results of tests con-
sisting of choices presented as monetary outcomes 
and objective probabilities. What diff erentiates it 
from other theories is the fact that it is primarily 
descriptive as it portrays the means in which peo-
ple act when confronted with choices identifi ed as 
gain/risk of loss. 
Utility is approached by comparing two states of 
wealth. For instance, utility of getting an extra 
$500 when one’s wealth is already $1 million is 
the diff erence between the utility of $1,000,500 
and the utility of $1 million (Kahneman, 2011). 
Th is important subjective distinction between the 
eff ect that gains and losses might have on the in-
dividual was long neglected in research, and it was 
believed that there was no point in examining it.
Furthermore, the prospect theory explains an im-
portant phenomenon that infl uences the choice: 
the manner in which the problem is framed con-
verts the risk aversion in risk seeking behavior and 
vice versa.
Th e prospect theory is more appropriate than 
some of the other theories (e.g. EUT) because it 
provides a reference point. It is the earlier state re-
lative to which gains and losses are evaluated. Th e-
re are three cognitive features at the center of inte-
rests of prospect theory that play an essential role 
in the evaluation of monetary outcomes and are 
immanent to many automatic processes of percep-
tion, judgment, and emotion (Kahneman, 2011).:
1. Evaluation, relative to a neutral reference 
point: For monetary outcomes, the usual refer-
ence point is the status quo; Outcomes that are 
better than the reference points are gains and 
those below the reference point are losses.
2. The principle of diminishing sensitivity: 
applies to both sensory dimensions and the 
evaluation of changes of wealth. Turning on a 
weak light has a strong effect in a dark room, 
but not so in a brightly illuminated room.
3. Loss aversion: When directly compared, 
losses loom larger than gains. This asymme-
try between the power of positive and nega-
tive expectations or experiences has an evolu-
tionary history. Organisms that treat threats as 
more urgent than opportunities have a better 
chance to survive and reproduce.
Decision-making under uncertainty is an impor-
tant factor in a crisis decision making. Most of 
the empirical research examines decision making 
under risk, not under uncertainty. Th e critique 
of such research is that gambling games from the 
handbook does not refl ect the alternatives in the 
problems of everyday, real world decision-making 
(Tversky & Wakker, 1995).
5. GAME THEORY
Game theory can be defi ned as a doctrine about 
mathematical models of confl ict and cooperation 
between intelligent, rational decision makers. It 
proposes a formal description of conscious, go-
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al-oriented decision-making processes. Th e real 
evidence of the impact of game theory is well 
recognized in economic sciences where theorists 
tend to understand confl ict and cooperation by 
studying the quantitative models and hypothetical 
examples (Myerson, 1991). Game-theoretic mo-
dels have six common features: confl icting parties, 
choices, information, desired outcomes, results of 
choices and outcomes dependent on choices of all 
participants. In the colloquialism of game theory, 
a game refers to each social situation that includes 
two or more players. 
An important notion of game theory is the notion 
of the equilibrium. Standard analysis of the equi-
librium, or balance respectively, presupposes that 
all players (Koehler & Harvey, 2004): 
1) form their beliefs based on the analysis of 
others’ potential actions (strategic thinking),
2) choose the best action generated by those 
beliefs (optimization) and
3) adjust their best actions and beliefs until they 
are in harmony with one another, that is, bal-
ance. 
In the game theory there is an assumption that for 
any rational decision-maker there must exist some 
way of assigning utility numbers to the various 
possible outcomes that the decision-maker cares 
about, so they always choose the option that maxi-
mizes their expected utility. Th at is the subject of 
the Expected-utility maximization theorem, which 
can be paraphrased as follows: if a decision maker 
would prefer option 1 over option 2 when event A 
occurs, and he would prefer option 1 over option 2 
when event A does not occur, then he should prefer 
option 1 even before he learns whether event A will 
occur or not (Myerson, 1991). 
Even if one is never involved in a situation in 
which people’s positions are as clearly defi ned as 
those studied by game theorists, one can still come 
to understand real competitive situations better by 
studying these hypothetical examples. 
Most of game theory is not meant to be purely nor-
mative as an equilibrium strategy is only ideal if 
other players believe that players will act in certain 
ways, that would require the theory to be descrip-
tive. Game theory is also not purely descriptive, it 
is more analytical: analysis of the formal implica-
tions of various levels of mutual rationality in stra-
tegic situations. A good part of business strategy 
decisions involve interdependent outcomes and 
therefore seem to lend themselves to game the-
ory. Game-theoretic modeling is appropriate, for 
example, when studying strategic actions between 
agents with diff ering goals, a situation typical of 
many strategic management issues.
It is rather questionable if game theory can be used 
as a technique that provides precise solutions to 
strategic management problems because it does 
not provide a defi nitive solution. For many real-
world problems, a game theoretic analysis may 
prove intractable. Capturing the reality of the situ-
ation may entail a model with hundreds of strate-
gies for each player but computing the equilibrium 
of such games is not an easy task (Madara, 2010).
6. JUDGEMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND 
BIASES
In models of unbounded rationality there is an 
assumption that all relevant information is availa-
ble to the decision maker. In a framing like this, 
the question arises: If people had valid information 
for eternity on disposal, how would they behave? 
Descriptive models of bounded rationality place 
emphasis on constraints of human mind and tend 
to answer questions regarding behavior of people 
under lack of information and time. It is Herbert 
Simon who is considered to be the founder of the 
term „bounded rationality“, where the „bounded“ 
refers to restraints in environment such as unavai-
lability of information as well as to the constraints 
of mind (e.g. retrievability of information). 
Heuristic is a method of education or a computati-
onal program in search for a solution or an answer 
to a posed question. It is defi ned as reasoning, not 
defi nite and strict, but tentative and barely accepta-
ble, whose purpose is fi nding a solution to a certain 
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problem (Simon, 1990). Heuristics as mental ope-
rations are employed in judgment under uncerta-
inty (Koehler & Harvey, 2004). 
Th e intuitive assessment of probability resembles 
the assessment of perceptual quantities such as dis-
tance or size. Th ese judgments are all based on data 
of limited validity, which is processed according to 
heuristic rules. Th e reliance on these rules leads to 
systematic estimation errors. Errors like these usu-
ally happen because: 1) People are not generally 
aware of the rules that govern their impressions 
and 2) People cannot deliberately control their per-
ceptual impressions (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973).
Gigerenzer tries to remove the stigma of irrationa-
lity and absolute fallibility from intuitive cognition 
and intuitive decision-making which are the center 
of heuristic approach. Intuitions or “gut feelings” 
are judgments that are fast occurring in one’s con-
sciousness (Pavić, 2009). He claims that intuitions 
are the result of an evolutionary process that has 
enabled the human mind to cope with challen-
ges of the outside world. Better understanding of 
heuristic principles and biases caused by intuitive 
reasoning can improve judgments and decision-
making in situations marked with ambiguity. 
7. PRESCRIPTION FOR CRISIS 
MANAGERS
In more than three decades of decision research, ra-
tional theories from economics, statistics, and logic 
have been used to argue that descriptive behavior 
falls systematically short of normative ideals. Th is 
gap between the normative and the descriptive has 
provoked many debates: Is there in fact a gap? And, 
if there is, can it be closed and biases removed? Th e 
identification and dissemination of better strategies 
belongs to a prescriptive domain of decision-ma-
king (Koehler & Harvey, 2004).
7.1. Expertize in decision making
Scholars of decision-making in psychology have 
focused extensively on a lack of rationality, not on 
the fact that people are able to improve their effi  -
ciency in problem solving and in raising their le-
vel of incentive with increased practice. Th ere are 
two ways in which decision-making and expertise 
can be shown to be related. In the fi rst approach, 
researchers studied how experts make decisions. 
In the second approach, researchers investigated 
whether people can be experts in making decisi-
ons, or, in other words, whether decision-making 
expertise or competence even exists.
Klein and other developed the naturalistic decisi-
on-making approach, which consists of studying 
real-world decision-making behavior (Campitelli 
& Gobet, 2010). In particular, they studied the 
decisions made by experts under time pressure. 
A striking result is that experts can understand 
problem situations and make decision rapidly in 
a matter of seconds. With routine problems, these 
decisions tend to be the correct ones, or at least rea-
sonable ones. It is generally accepted that this rapid 
decision making is made possible by the perceptual 
knowledge that experts have acquired over years of 
practice and training. Klein goes even further, cla-
iming: “in certain domains and situations, experts 
consider only one course of action that they carry 
out, thus not even choosing among two or more 
possible options” (Campitelli & Gobet, 2010:12).
It is worth mentioning that expert’s cognitive 
system does not diff er notably from that of novi-
ces; parameters such as short-term memory capa-
city and learning rate are invariant across skill le-
vels. Th e only diff erence is the knowledge experts 
acquire by experience and training through years 
of eff ortful dedication to their domain of exper-
tise (Bruine de Bruin, Parker, & Fischhoff , 2007). 
Eff ort and experience do not change the archi-
tecture of cognitive system, they make it more effi  -
cient. Expert knowledge saves them time by avo-
iding exploring useless alternatives. Experts are 
more selective in their decision making-process. 
However, they are not perfectly rational subjects. 
7.2. Th e constitution of decision making in 
crisis situations
In the literature on crisis management, the centra-
lization of decision-making is oft en portrayed as a 
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primary organizational structure of crisis response. 
It implies concentration of power in the hands of a 
smaller number of executives (Kešetović, Korajlić 
& Toth, 2013). Th e setting of centralization should 
be examined further, as well as the structures and 
the systems of crisis response. It is the time pressu-
re and the lack of information which makes crisis 
manager’s decision-making a particularly stressful 
activity. When the degree of perceived time pressu-
re is high, structures that enable rapid responses are 
adopted.
Th is entails an ad hoc improvisation. On the other 
hand, when the degree of perceived time pressure is 
low, more formal, preplanned contingent response 
modes emerge (Boin, 2008). 
Time pressure is perceived diff erently at strategic 
and operational levels which constrains crisis ma-
nagement responses in multiple ways. At the ope-
rational level, time pressure is generally unambiguo-
usly visible, requiring a basically instant response. 
At the strategic level, perceptions of time are miti-
gated by the concern for a long-term ramifi cation of 
events. From there, diff erent crisis-induced types of 
response emerge (Boin, 2008): formal and informal 
decentralization, non-decision-making, situational 
dominance, paralysis and strategic avoidance of res-
ponsibility. 
Apart from the question of centralization, the se-
cond mediating variable that aff ects the quality of 
decision-making and the fl ow of crisis is the res-
ponding system’s precrisis organizational structure, 
divided into mechanistic and pragmatic response 
structures.
Mechanistic structures tend to involve a routine-ori-
ented bureaucratic hierarchy and formal chains of 
command and communication. Pragmatic structu-
res are commonly associated with some form of ma-
trix or project organization. Organizations whose 
pre-crisis structures possess the characteristics of 
the pragmatic type will experience less diffi  culty in 
adapting to crisis events. In particular, improvised 
and decentralized responses to crisis-induced time 
pressures will be regarded as less problematic, and 
will, therefore, come about more quickly and eff ecti-
vely than in centralized organizations.
If there appears to be an overall need for quick acti-
on (minutes or hours), interagency diff erences will 
temporarily be put aside. If this is not the case, or 
when the initial sense of urgency abates, bureaucra-
tic politics will increase. Also, the fact that the domi-
nant structural pattern of crisis response may shift  
as the crisis evolves through time should be taken 
into account. Th is is particularly the case in “slow” 
or protracted crises, where the initial tendency to 
misperceive or underestimate the threat can lead to 
postponement of decision act. 
Clear advantages and disadvantages appear from a 
functionalist perspective, for instance, strategic cen-
tralization is aimed at increasing top-level control 
over crisis operations but has a high risk of presen-
ting policy makers with an input overload. Th is may 
impel toward dysfunctional coping behaviors such 
as hypervigilance (Boin, 2008).
Th inking in terms of alternative models of structu-
ring a crisis response may enhance a more equitable 
assessment of the functions and dysfunctions of ri-
gidly centralized decision-making. For each structu-
ral pattern, diff erentiation may be identifi ed for 
successful and unsuccessful cases of crisis manage-
ment. Consequently, hypotheses identifying the 
structural and processual determinants of success 
and failure in each of these cases may be developed 
and tested. Th e results of such an analysis may then 
provide an important contribution to a much-nee-
ded prescriptive theory of crisis management. 
8. INFLUENCE ON PROCESSES OF 
DECISION-MAKING AND STRESS 
REDUCTION IN CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
Stress induced by time pressure and lack of in-
formation deteriorates the capacity of quality 
judgment and valid decision-making signifi cantly. 
In the context of an organization, as contraction of 
authority increases, the stress upon existing execu-
tives is heightened too. Hence, the increase in the 
stress on authority units can lead to the transfer of 
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some of the stress to the other parts of the organi-
zation. By defi nition, crises are events unexpected 
from the organization. In an unfamiliar situation 
some degree of trial and error is present in seeking 
a suitable response. When, for lack of feedback, an 
authority unit fails to discover that an error has 
been made, the organization’s viability comes in 
question (Boin, 2008). 
In order to improve decision-making processes in 
dynamic environments such as crises, it is nece-
ssary to determine required skills and measures so 
that stress levels can be reduced. When it comes 
to required skills that stand out, it is the skills of 
situational awareness and critical thinking – skills 
that are not innate, but rather the ones that should 
 be acquired over time through practice.
With respect to preventive measures, there is a ne-
cessity to establish the type and effi  cacy of suitable 
training, which, due to the dynamic character of 
crisis, is not an easy task. General training is not 
suffi  cient as a preparation for a highly stressful 
conditions. Th erefore, a need for conducting a spe-
cifi c type of training called stress training, designed 
purely for the purpose of preparation of cognitive 
and behavioral response in highly stressful envi-
ronment is pointed out. Th ose who learn how to 
approach demands in a positive and self-confi dent 
manner are less likely to fi nd themselves distrac-
ted by outside variables of stressful environment 
(Hancock, Vincenzi, Wise, & Mouloua, 2008). 
9. CONCLUSION
As technology changes, the scope of potential 
man-made crisis is increasing, as well as the po-
tential scope of decisions about crisis preparedne-
Figure 1: Graphic display of the models of decision-making
Source: authors
ss, mitigation, and response.  It is important that 
crisis analysts recognize these issues and make 
analytical and empirical contributions that faci-
litate at least a reasoned debate about their con-
sequences. 
In crisis management, the maxims of the normati-
ve domain of decision theory based on the idea of 
expected utility are signifi cant in risk assessment 
and judgments of possibilities. Game theory can 
be useful in some situations for planning the stra-
tegy of action. Th e value of the prospect theory 
and the models of bounded rationality lay in their 
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ability to educate us about the ways in which pe-
ople actually decide under risk or uncertainty. To 
prevent individual decision makers to be doomed 
solely on intuitive decision making, although it 
is inevitable, it should be underpinned by imple-
mentation and practice of situational awareness 
and critical thinking skills. Insights acquired by 
rationalization of decision theory and knowledge 
about constraints of human mind to make valid 
judgments, particularly in a time of crisis, may 
prompt critical thinking and alteration of cogni-
tive strategies, and consequently, decrease the im-
pact of stress.
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MODELI ODLUČIVANJA – PREDNOSTI I NEDOSTACI 
U KRIZNOM UPRAVLJANJU
Sažetak: 
Profesionalni stres kod osoba na upravljačkim pozicijama u kriznim situacijama premalo je proučavan. 
Visok stupanj odgovornosti kod kriznih menadžera vezuje uz sebe visoki stresni potencijal koji uvelike 
ovisi o samoj kvaliteti vodstva i donesenih odluka. Element odluke od presudnog je značaja za uspješno 
ovladavanje krizom. U svrhu boljeg razumijevanja i poboljšanja procesa odlučivanja u kriznim situaci-
jama ukazuje se potreba za racionalizacijom teorije odlučivanja. Istraživanja usmjerena na problemati-
ku odlučivanja provode znanstvenici različitih profi la, a za rezultat imaju formiranje osnovnih pristupa 
suvremene teorije odlučivanja. Normativni pristup je zasnovan na vjerojatnosnim funkcijama dok pre-
skriptivni pruža smjernice za odlučivanje u praksi. Naposljetku, deskriptivni pristup bavi se heuristikama 
koje opisuju kako ljudi zapravo odlučuju. U stvarnim situacijama odlučivanje je određeno kontekstual-
nim i psihološkim ograničenjima svojstvenih svim ljudima. Pritom važnu ulogu imaju uočeni obras-
ci ponašanja kod ljudi pri odlučivanju u uvjetima neizvjesnosti, različiti od onih kod odlučivanja pod 
rizikom. Postoje značajne razlike u uporabnoj vrijednosti pojedinih modela odlučivanja stoga ovaj rad 
razmatra različite modele odlučivanja i njihovu primjenjivost u kriznim situacijama u svrhu prevencije 
i smanjivanja stupnja stresa kod odgovornih osoba. U zaključku ovog rada pristup ograničene racio-
nalnosti zasnovan na heurističkim strategijama nameće se kao najpogodniji, pogrešiv, ali često jedini 
mogući izbor. Uz usvajanje vještina situacijske svjesnosti i kritičkog razmišljanja potkrijepljenih ade-
kvatnim stres-treninzima i simulacijama te preventivnim mjerama poput izrade analiza rizika, strategija 
djelovanja i izračuna vjerojatnosti na temelju postulata normativne domene teorije odlučivanja moguće 
je umanjiti negativan utjecaj stresa i time pospješiti odlučivanje u kriznom upravljanju.
Ključne riječi: teorija odlučivanja, krizno upravljanje, prevencija, stres, modeli odlučivanja
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